content/RoughV1.md


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Title: Rough Cut at v0.01 Proof of Concept Feature Set
Date: 2016-12-15 22:43
Modified: 2021-02-14 17:33
This is a proposed version 0.01 product as a proof of concept.  The
intent is not to have a very useful product, but rather to gain
confidence in our architecture, tools, and team.  The result is intended
to be the basis for further development into a more useful second stage,
in the sense of
agile development.
It very intentionally is not a
waterfall design,
The interface between the Green and Yellow layers is seen as an important design
inflection.
Some code will be in C in the Green (auxiliary core) because we can get it open
source out of the can.  for v.2 (or whatever) we would move it down to the FPGA in
Verilog.
FPGA Overview


Sketch of TRNG Chain


Off-FPGA

Persistent Storage
For Keys and Time
Or the battery for tamper wipe is big enough to hold the FPGA up
Or the Green processor has enough non-volatile store


Entropy Source
Realtime Clock
Tamper Mechanism

Layers
#!html
<h1 style="text-align: left; color: blue">
  Blue / FPGA
</h1>


TRNG
BigNumber, Modular, & Exponentiation (expose to green for RSA)
SHA-256
AES-128
EC for ECDH. Curve3617 would be nice, but whatever we can get open source to start
OpenRISC Core or ARM to support Green (maybe FreeScale from Bunnie)

#!html
<h1 style="text-align: left; color: green">
  Green / On-Chip Core
</h1>


RSA 2048 & 4096 (move to blue later) [ 1024 for Tor? ]
MACs: HMAC, 1305, uMAC
DH (move to blue later)
Device Activation, Move Authorization, Wiping

#!html
<h1 style="text-align: left; color: yellow">
  Yellow / Off-Chip Support
</h1>


Interface to Red
PKCS#8
PKCS#11
PGP Support


X.509 and PGP
PKCS#11 for POLA resistance
No PKCS#10 because it will take a year
Backup may be just dump/restore of the whole FPGA/CoreState

#!html
<h1 style="text-align: left; color: red">
  Red / Applications
</h1>


X.509 CA
DNSSEC
PGP (asymmetric key sign/verify + symmetric message encryption/decryption)
Tor consensus(?)

Issues in v0.01

License of tool chain to build
License for borrowed components (open cores, open fpga)
License for result
What we build ourselves - BSD
What components we ship - life is compromise


Toolchains, Verilog, C, ...
FPGAs and ASICs use a Verilog-based toolchain.  There are no mature open
  Verilog compilers so the DDC approach
  will not work.  Net-list optimization is also an issue.  We're looking into this,
  but it's going to be really hard.  Research for v2.
Protoyping platform
Bunnie's Novena laptop
Altera Evaluation Board


RTC, external connectivity to et some sort of assured time
Repository - too many git junkies.  Keep main repo on our server for the security boundary.  Can mirror on GitHub to be socially cool.
Emacs or vi (no Rob, not TECO) :)