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-= External project TorHSM
-
-== Problem
-
-The [https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en Tor network] is defined by a small number, about ten, of special relays called Directory Authorities (DAs).
-
-Directory Authorities sign the critical `status votes` and `consensus status` documents using SHA-1 and SHA-256 together with RSA-2048 or RSA-3072 once per hour, using medium-term on-line `authority signing keys` signed by their individual off-line long-term `authority identity keys`. Authority signing keys typically have a lifetime of three to twelve months.
-
-Authority signing keys are currently kept on the same general purpose computer that runs the Directory Authority and are thus subject to a large number of network threats.
-
-== Proposed solution
-
-Move `authority signing keys` away from the general purpose computer onto an external device which can sign the consensus document without exposing key material to the networked computer system.
-
-The !CrypTech project has created an open source (BSD licensed) `Alpha` hardware which would be especially suitable, because the open software and hardware offers unprecedented transparency while also enabling a simple, efficient and legacy-free solution.
-
-=== Current typical key roll-over procedure
-
-* Generate new `authority signing key` on offline system
-* Sign new key using `authority identity key` on offline system
-* Save new `authority signing key` and `key certificate` on USB stick
-* Transfer new `authority signing key` and `key certificate` to DA system via network
-
-=== The key roll-over procedure becomes
-
-* Use administrative tool from this project on DA system to generate new `authority signing key` on HSM
-  * The new `authority signing key` initially remains inactive and unavailable for use
-  * The public part of new `authority signing key` is exported from HSM onto the DA system
-* Transfer new public part of `authority signing key` to USB stick
-* Sign new public key using `authority identity key` on offline system
-* Save `key certificate` on USB stick
-* Transfer `key certificate` to DA system via network and make available to DA
-* (Optional?) Use administrative tool from this project on DA to present `key certificate` to HSM
-* Activate key (automatic on verified `key certificate`, manual without `key certificate` verification)
-
-== Milestones
-
-The minimum viable product (MVP) at MS3 is a system where the authority signing key is no longer accessible by the DA system while not making any part of the process worse from a security perspective.
-
-The system at MS6 (to MS8) does not make any part of the process worse from a //usability// perspective (subjective) and also adds rate limiting.
-
-=== MS1 -- PoC using OpenSSL `PKCS#11` engine
-* tor using openssl p11 engine; no key management or rate-limiting
-* useful for test and verification
-
-=== MS2 -- Using !CrypTech RPC instead of OpenSSL
-* function declarations in `sw/libhal/hal.h`, definitions in `sw/libhal/rpc_*.c`
-* TODO: daemon
-
-=== MS3 (MVP) -- HSM configuration I
-* "HSM configuration" is aka "key management"
-* administrator connected to MGMT can make HSM
-  * generate a MK based on passphrase
-  * print public part of MK
-* administrator connected to USER can make HSM
-    * generate a new authority signing key pair, wrap the secret part in MK, store both parts in flash memory and export the public part
-
-=== MS4 -- HSM configuration II
-* rate limiting 
-* enforcing key validity
-
-=== MS5 -- Enforcing key validity HSM side
-
-=== MS6 -- Rate limiting of signatures
-
-=== MS7 -- New Shiny Crypto Hardware API using !CrypTech RPC
-
-=== MS8 -- Getting entropy from HSM
-
-=== MS9 -- Support for more protocols in New Shiny Crypto Hardware API
-
-== References
-
-* [https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/dir-spec.txt Tor directory protocol, version 3]
-* [https://www.crowdsupply.com/cryptech/open-hardware-security-module CrypTech Alpha system]
-