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authorRob Austein <sra@hactrn.net>2016-03-03 23:25:28 -0500
committerRob Austein <sra@hactrn.net>2016-03-03 23:25:28 -0500
commit8f9c3d1e3c9b2f882032a551b8ca46684ab030ae (patch)
treea5713e004a20678d88b69eac060472b14a1545f9 /ks.c
parentcef7ba6f7024a2c3a53760be8c5fc4f937e8efb5 (diff)
Initial implementations of ks_get_kek(). Untested, and none of these
are secure (the one in ks_flash.c is a stub, and the others are for cases where we have no secure hardware in which to store the KEK). These are primarily for testing, since in the long run the entire software implementation of AES-keywrap will be replaced by Verilog which never lets software see the unwrapped key. Or so says current theory. For the moment, we just need something that will let us test the rest of the RPC and keystore mechanisms.
Diffstat (limited to 'ks.c')
-rw-r--r--ks.c8
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/ks.c b/ks.c
index 24cafca..a856bbf 100644
--- a/ks.c
+++ b/ks.c
@@ -294,14 +294,6 @@ hal_error_t hal_ks_get_pin(const hal_user_t user,
return HAL_OK;
}
-hal_error_t hal_ks_get_kek(uint8_t *kek,
- size_t *kek_len,
- const size_t kek_max)
-{
-# warning Stub out hal_ks_get_kek() for now
- return HAL_ERROR_IMPOSSIBLE;
-}
-
/*
* Local variables:
* indent-tabs-mode: nil