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-Title: AssuredTooChain
-Author: trac
-Date: 2016-12-15 22:44
-
-# Issues of an Assured Tool-Chain
-
-We do not have any assurance that our basic tools are not compromised.
-
-* Compilers
-* Operating Systems
-* Hardware Platforms
-* Verilog and Other Tools to Produce Chips
-
-
-At the base, is the compiler. The fear was first formally expressed in
-Ken Thompson's 1984 Turing Award Lecture
-[Reflections on Trusting Trust](http://www.ece.cmu.edu/~ganger/712.fall02/papers/p761-thompson.pdf).
-
-David A. Wheeler's PhD thesis, [Fully Countering Trusting Trust through Diverse Double-Compiling](http://www.dwheeler.com/trusting-trust/)
-outlines how we might deal with the compiler trust conundrum.