From b092ffbcbe2c9398494f7dc9db6f0796971633e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Rob Austein Date: Sun, 13 Sep 2020 23:04:30 +0000 Subject: Import Cryptech wiki dump --- raw-wiki-dump/GitRepositories%2Fsw%2Flibhal | 298 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 298 insertions(+) create mode 100644 raw-wiki-dump/GitRepositories%2Fsw%2Flibhal (limited to 'raw-wiki-dump/GitRepositories%2Fsw%2Flibhal') diff --git a/raw-wiki-dump/GitRepositories%2Fsw%2Flibhal b/raw-wiki-dump/GitRepositories%2Fsw%2Flibhal new file mode 100644 index 0000000..29132dc --- /dev/null +++ b/raw-wiki-dump/GitRepositories%2Fsw%2Flibhal @@ -0,0 +1,298 @@ +{{{ +#!htmlcomment + +This page is maintained automatically by a script. Don't modify this page by hand, +your changes will just be overwritten the next time the script runs. Talk to your +Friendly Neighborhood Repository Maintainer if you need to change something here. + +}}} + +{{{ +#!html +

libhal

+ +

Overview

+ +

This library combines a set of low-level API functions which talk to +the Cryptech FPGA cores with a set of higher-level functions providing +various cryptographic services.

+ +

There's some overlap between the low-level code here and the low-level +code in core/platform/novena, which will need sorting out some day, +but at the time this library forked that code, the +core/platform/novena code was all written to support a test harness +rather than a higher-level API.

+ +

Current contents of the library:

+ + + +

Most of these are fairly well self-contained, although the PBKDF2 +implementation uses the hash-core-based HMAC implementation with +fallback to a software implementation if the cores aren't available.

+ +

The major exceptions are the RSA and ECDSA implementations, which uses +an external bignum implementation (libtfm) to handle a lot of the +arithmetic. In the long run, much or all of this may end up being +implemented in Verilog, but for the moment all of the RSA math except +for modular exponentiation is happening in software, as is all of the +math for ECDSA verification; ECDSA math for key generation and signing +on the P-256 and P-384 curves is done in the ECDSA base point +multiplier cores when those are available.

+ +

RSA

+ +

The RSA implementation includes a compile-time option to bypass the +ModExp core and do everything in software, because the ModExp core is +a tad slow at the moment (others are hard at work fixing this).

+ +

The RSA implementation includes optional blinding (enabled by default).

+ +

ECDSA

+ +

The ECDSA implementation is specific to the NIST prime curves P-256, +P-384, and P-521.

+ +

The ECDSA implementation includes a compile-time option to allow test +code to bypass the CSPRNG in order to test against known test vectors. +Do NOT enable this in production builds, as ECDSA depends on good +random numbers not just for private keys but for individual +signatures, and an attacker who knows the random number used for a +particular signature can use this to recover the private key. +Arguably, this option should be removed from the code entirely.

+ +

The ECDSA software implementation attempts to be constant-time, to +reduce the risk of timing channel attacks. The algorithms chosen for +the point arithmetic are a tradeoff between speed and code complexity, +and can probably be improved upon even in software; reimplementing at +least the field arithmetic in hardware would probably also help. +Signing and key generation performance is significantly better when +the ECDSA base point multiplier cores are available.

+ +

The point addition and point doubling algorithms in the current ECDSA +software implementation come from the EFD. At least at the +moment, we're only interested in ECDSA with the NIST prime curves, so +we use algorithms optimized for a=-3.

+ +

The point multiplication algorithm is a straightforward double-and-add +loop, which is not the fastest possible algorithm, but is relatively +easy to confirm by inspection as being constant-time within the limits +imposed by the NIST curves. Point multiplication could probably be +made faster by using a non-adjacent form (NAF) representation for the +scalar, but the author doesn't understand that well enough to +implement it as a constant-time algorithm. In theory, changing to a +NAF representation could be done without any change to the public API.

+ +

Points stored in keys and curve parameters are in affine format, but +point arithmetic is performed in Jacobian projective coordinates, with +the coordinates themselves in Montgomery form; final mapping back to +affine coordinates also handles the final Montgomery reduction.

+ +

Hash-Based Signatures

+ +

A hashsig private key is a Merkle tree of one-time signing keys, which can +be used to sign a finite number of messages. Since they don't rely on +"hard math" for security, hashsig schemes are quantum-resistant.

+ +

This hashsig code is a clean-room implementation of draft-mcgrew-hash-sigs. +It has been shown to interoperate with the Cisco reference code (each can +verify the other's signatures).

+ +

Following the recommendations of the draft, we only store the topmost hash +tree (the "root tree") in the token keystore; lower-level trees are stored +in the volatile keystore, and are regenerated upon a system restart.

+ +

This implementation has limitations on the number of keys, size of OTS +keys, and size of signatures, because of the design of the keystore and of +the RPC mechanism:

+ +
    +
  1. The token keystore is a fairly small flash, partitioned into 2048 +8096-byte blocks. Therefore, we can't support LMS algorithm types > +lms_sha256_n32_h10 (a.k.a. h=10, or 1024 keys per tree). In this case, +keygen will return HAL_ERROR_NO_KEY_INDEX_SLOTS.
    2. +
+ +

Additionally, the 8KB key storage size means that we can't support LM-OTS +algorithm type lmots_sha256_n32_w1, which has an OTS key size of 8504 +bytes. In this case, keygen will return HAL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEY.

+ +
    +

  1. The volatile keystore is currently limited to 1280 keys, so only 2 +levels at h=10, but more levels at h=5. One could easily increase the size +of the volatile keystore, but L=2/h=10 gives us a key that can sign 1M +messages, which is sufficient for development and testing purposes.

    2. +

  2. The RPC mechanism currently limits request and response messages to +16KB, so we can't generate or verify signatures greater than that size. +In this case, keygen will return HAL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEY.

    3. +
+ +

Because the hashsig private key consists of a large number of one-time +signing keys, and because only the root tree is stored in flash, it can +take several minutes to reconstruct the full tree on system restart. +During this time, attempts to generate a hashsig key, delete a hashsig +key, or sign with a hashsig key will return HAL_ERROR_NOT_READY.

+ +

A hashsig private key can sign at most 2^(L*h) messages. (System restarts +will cause the lower-level trees to be regenerated, which will need to be +signed with by the root tree, so frequent restarts will rapidly exhaust +the root tree.) When a hashsig key is exhausted, any attempt to use it for +signing will return HAL_ERROR_HASHSIG_KEY_EXHAUSTED.

+ +

Keystore

+ +

The keystore is basically a light-weight database intended to be run +directly over some kind of block-access device, with an internal +low-level driver interface so that we can use the same API for +multiple keystore devices (eg, flash for "token objects" and RAM for +"session objects", in the PKCS #11 senses of those terms).

+ +

The available storage is divided up into "blocks" of a fixed size; for +simplicity, the block size is a multiple of the subsector size of the +flash chip on the Alpha platform, since that's the minimum erasable +unit. All state stored in the keystore itself follows the conventions +needed for flash devices, whether the device in question is flash or +not. The basic rule here is that one can only clear bits, never set +them: the only way to set a bit is to erase the whole block and start +over. So blocks progress from an initial state ("erased") where all +bits are set to one, through several states where the block contains +useful data, and ending in a state where all bits are set to zero +("zeroed"), because that's the way that flash hardware works.

+ +

The keystore implementation also applies a light-weight form of wear +leveling to all keystore devices, whether they're flash devices or +not. The wear-leveling mechanism is not particularly sophisticated, +but should suffice. The wear-leveling code treats the entirety of a +particular keystore device as a ring buffer of blocks, and keeps track +of which blocks have been used recently by zeroing blocks upon freeing +them rather than erasing them immediately, while also always keeping +the block at the current head of the free list in the erased state. +Taken together, this is enough to recover location of the block at the +head of the free list after a reboot, which is sufficient for a +round-robin wear leveling strategy.

+ +

The block format includes a field for a CRC-32 checksum, which covers +the entire block except for a few specific fields which need to be +left out. On reboot, blocks with bad CRC-32 values are considered +candidates for reuse, but are placed at the end of the free list, +preserve their contents for as long as possible in case the real +problem is a buggy firmware update.

+ +

At the moment, the decision about whether to use the CRC-32 mechanism +is up to the individual driver: the flash driver uses it, the RAM +driver (which never stores anything across reboots anyway) does not.

+ +

Since the flash-like semantics do not allow setting bits, updates to a +block always consist of allocating a new block and copying the +modified data. The keystore code uses a trivial lock-step protocol +for this: first:

+ +
    +
  1. The old block is marked as a "tombstone";
    2. +
  2. The new block (with modified data) is written;
    3. +
  3. The old block is erased.
    4. +
+ +

This protocol is deliberately as simple as possible, so that there is +always a simple recovery path on reboot.

+ +

Active blocks within a keystore are named by UUIDs. With one +exception, these are always type-4 (random) UUIDs, generated directly +from output of the TRNG. The one exception is the current PIN block, +which always uses the reserved all-zeros UUID, which cannot possibly +conflict with a type-4 UUID (by definition).

+ +

The core of the keystore mechanism is the ks->index[] array, which +contains nothing but a list of block numbers. This array is divided +into two parts: the first part is the index of active blocks, which is +kept sorted (by UUID); the second part is the round-robin free list. +Everything else in the keystore is indexed by these block numbers, +which means that the index array is the only data structure which the +keystore code needs to sort or rotate when adding, removing, or +updating a block. Because the block numbers themselves are small +integers, the index array itself is small enough that shuffling data +within it using memmove() is a relatively cheap operation, which in +turn avoids a lot of complexity that would be involved in managing +more sophisticated data structures.

+ +

The keystore code includes both caching of recently used keystore +blocks (to avoid unnecessary flash reads) and caching of the location +of the block corresponding to a particular UUID (to avoid unnecessary +index searches). Aside from whatever direct performance benefits this +might bring, this also frees the pkey layer that sits directly on top +of the keystore code from needing to keep a lot of active state on +particular keystore objects, which is important given that this whole +thing sits under an RPC protocol driven by a client program which can +impose arbitrary delays between any two operations at the pkey layer.

+ +

Key backup

+ +

The key backup mechanism is a straightforward three-step process, +mediated by a Python script which uses the Python client +implementation of the RPC mechanism. Steps:

+ +
    +

  1. Destination HSM (target of key transfer) generates an RSA keypair, +exports the public key (the "key encryption key encryption key" or +"KEKEK").

    2. +

  2. Source HSM (origin of the key transfer) wraps keys to be backed up +using AES keywrap with key encryption keys (KEKs) generated by the +TRNG; these key encryption keys are in turn encrypted with RSA +public key (KEKEK) generated by the receipient HSM.

    3. +

  3. Destination HSM receives wrapped keys, unwraps the KEKs using the +KEKEK then unwraps the wrapped private keys.

    4. +
+ +

Transfer of the wrapped keys between the two HSMs can be by any +convenient mechanism; for simplicity, cryptech_backup script bundles +everything up in a text file using JSON and Base64 encoding.

+ +

Multiplexer daemon

+ +

While the C client library can be built to talk directly to the +Cryptech Alpha board, in most cases it is more convenient to use the +cryptech_muxd multiplexer daemon, which is now the default. Client +code talks to cryptech_muxd via a PF_UNIX socket; cryptech_muxd +handles interleaving of messages between multiple clients, and also +manages access to the Alpha's console port.

+ +

The multiplexer requires two external Python libraries, Tornado +(version 4.0 or later) and PySerial (version 3.0 or later).

+ +

In the long run, the RPC mechanism will need to be wrapped in some +kind of secure channel protocol, but we're not there yet.

+ +

API

+ +

Yeah, we ought to document the API, Real Soon Now, perhaps using +Doxygen. For the moment, see the function prototypes in hal.h, +the Python definitions in cryptech.libhal, and and comments in the +code.

+}}} + +[[RepositoryIndex(format=table,glob=sw/libhal)]] + +|| Clone `https://git.cryptech.is/sw/libhal.git` || -- cgit v1.2.3