aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/rpc_misc.c
blob: cf5e4a0914b7991b32435bf2ed07534efaca7f43 (plain) (blame)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
/*
 * rpc_misc.c
 * ----------
 * RPC interface to TRNG and PIN functions
 *
 * Authors: Rob Austein
 * Copyright (c) 2015, NORDUnet A/S All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are
 * met:
 * - Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
 *   this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 *
 * - Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *   notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
 *   documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 *
 * - Neither the name of the NORDUnet nor the names of its contributors may
 *   be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
 *   without specific prior written permission.
 *
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS
 * IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
 * TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
 * PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
 * HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
 * TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR
 * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
 * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING
 * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS
 * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 */

#include <assert.h>

#include "hal.h"
#include "hal_internal.h"

static hal_error_t get_version(uint32_t *version)
{
  *version = RPC_VERSION;
  return HAL_OK;
}

static hal_error_t get_random(void *buffer, const size_t length)
{
  assert(buffer != NULL && length > 0);

  return hal_get_random(NULL, buffer, length);
}

/*
 * PINs, salt, and iteration count live in the keystore.
 *
 * We also need a client table in conventional memory (here, probably)
 * to record login status.
 *
 * The USER and SO PINs correspond to PKCS #11.
 *
 * The WHEEL PIN is the one that's allowed to change the SO PIN.
 *
 * It's a bit unclear how we should manage changes to the WHEEL PIN.
 * Implementing a factory default would be easy enough (just
 * pre-compute and compile in a const hal_ks_pin_t), question is
 * whether doing so provides anything useful.  Certainly adds no real
 * security, question is whether it would help prevent accidently
 * bricking the HSM right out of the shrink wrap.
 *
 * More interesting question is whether we should ever allow the WHEEL
 * PIN to be changed a second time without toasting the keystore.
 */

typedef struct {
  hal_client_handle_t handle;
  hal_user_t logged_in;
} client_slot_t;

#ifndef HAL_PIN_MINIMUM_ITERATIONS
#define HAL_PIN_MINIMUM_ITERATIONS 10000
#endif

#ifndef HAL_PIN_DEFAULT_ITERATIONS
#define HAL_PIN_DEFAULT_ITERATIONS 20000
#endif

static uint32_t hal_pin_default_iterations = HAL_PIN_DEFAULT_ITERATIONS;

#ifndef HAL_STATIC_CLIENT_STATE_BLOCKS
#define HAL_STATIC_CLIENT_STATE_BLOCKS	10
#endif

#if HAL_STATIC_CLIENT_STATE_BLOCKS > 0
static client_slot_t client_handle[HAL_STATIC_CLIENT_STATE_BLOCKS];
#endif

/*
 * Client handles are supplied by the application, we don't get to
 * pick them, we just store them and associate a login state with
 * them.  HAL_USER_NONE indicates an empty slot in the table.
 */

static inline client_slot_t *alloc_slot(void)
{
  client_slot_t *slot = NULL;
  hal_critical_section_start();

#if HAL_STATIC_CLIENT_STATE_BLOCKS > 0
  for (int i = 0; slot == NULL && i < sizeof(client_handle)/sizeof(*client_handle); i++)
    if (client_handle[i].logged_in == HAL_USER_NONE)
      slot = &client_handle[i];
#endif

  hal_critical_section_end();
  return slot;
}

static inline client_slot_t *find_handle(const hal_client_handle_t handle)
{
  client_slot_t *slot = NULL;
  hal_critical_section_start();

#if HAL_STATIC_CLIENT_STATE_BLOCKS > 0
  for (int i = 0; slot == NULL && i < sizeof(client_handle)/sizeof(*client_handle); i++)
    if (client_handle[i].logged_in != HAL_USER_NONE && client_handle[i].handle.handle == handle.handle)
      slot = &client_handle[i];
#endif

  hal_critical_section_end();
  return slot;
}

static hal_error_t login(const hal_client_handle_t client,
                         const hal_user_t user,
                         const char * const pin, const size_t pin_len)
{
  assert(pin != NULL && pin_len != 0);
  assert(user == HAL_USER_NORMAL || user == HAL_USER_SO || user == HAL_USER_WHEEL);

  const hal_ks_pin_t *p;
  hal_error_t err;

  if ((err = hal_get_pin(user, &p)) != HAL_OK)
    return err;

  uint8_t buf[sizeof(p->pin)];
  const uint32_t iterations = p->iterations == 0 ? hal_pin_default_iterations : p->iterations;

  if ((err = hal_pbkdf2(NULL, hal_hash_sha256, (const uint8_t *) pin, pin_len,
                        p->salt, sizeof(p->salt), buf, sizeof(buf), iterations)) != HAL_OK)
    return err;

  unsigned diff = 0;
  for (int i = 0; i < sizeof(buf); i++)
    diff |= buf[i] ^ p->pin[i];

  if (diff != 0)
    return HAL_ERROR_PIN_INCORRECT;

  client_slot_t *slot = find_handle(client);

  if (slot == NULL && (slot = alloc_slot()) == NULL)
    return HAL_ERROR_NO_CLIENT_SLOTS_AVAILABLE;

  slot->handle = client;
  slot->logged_in = user;

  return HAL_OK;
}

static hal_error_t is_logged_in(const hal_client_handle_t client,
                                const hal_user_t user)
{
  assert(user == HAL_USER_NORMAL || user == HAL_USER_SO || user == HAL_USER_WHEEL);

  client_slot_t *slot = find_handle(client);

  if (slot == NULL || slot->logged_in != user)
    return HAL_ERROR_FORBIDDEN;

  return HAL_OK;
}

static hal_error_t logout(const hal_client_handle_t client)
{
  client_slot_t *slot = find_handle(client);

  if (slot != NULL)
    slot->logged_in = HAL_USER_NONE;

  return HAL_OK;
}

static hal_error_t logout_all(void)
{
#if HAL_STATIC_CLIENT_STATE_BLOCKS > 0
  for (int i = 0; i < sizeof(client_handle)/sizeof(*client_handle); i++)
    client_handle[i].logged_in = HAL_USER_NONE;
#endif

  return HAL_OK;
}

static hal_error_t set_pin(const hal_client_handle_t client,
                           const hal_user_t user,
                           const char * const newpin, const size_t newpin_len)
{
  assert(newpin != NULL && newpin_len >= hal_rpc_min_pin_length && newpin_len <= hal_rpc_max_pin_length);

  if ((user != HAL_USER_NORMAL || is_logged_in(client, HAL_USER_SO) != HAL_OK) &&
      is_logged_in(client, HAL_USER_WHEEL) != HAL_OK)
    return HAL_ERROR_FORBIDDEN;

  const hal_ks_pin_t *pp;
  hal_error_t err;

  if ((err = hal_get_pin(user, &pp)) != HAL_OK)
    return err;

  hal_ks_pin_t p = *pp;

  p.iterations = hal_pin_default_iterations;

  if ((err = hal_get_random(NULL, p.salt, sizeof(p.salt)))      != HAL_OK ||
      (err = hal_pbkdf2(NULL, hal_hash_sha256,
                        (const uint8_t *) newpin, newpin_len,
                        p.salt, sizeof(p.salt),
                        p.pin,  sizeof(p.pin), p.iterations))   != HAL_OK ||
      (err = hal_set_pin(user, &p))                             != HAL_OK)
    return err;

  return HAL_OK;
}

hal_error_t hal_set_pin_default_iterations(const hal_client_handle_t client,
                                           const uint32_t iterations)
{
  if ((is_logged_in(client, HAL_USER_WHEEL) != HAL_OK) &&
      (is_logged_in(client, HAL_USER_SO) != HAL_OK))
    return HAL_ERROR_FORBIDDEN;

  /* should probably store this in flash somewhere */
  hal_pin_default_iterations = (iterations == 0) ? HAL_PIN_DEFAULT_ITERATIONS : iterations;
  return HAL_OK;
}

const hal_rpc_misc_dispatch_t hal_rpc_local_misc_dispatch = {
  .set_pin      = set_pin,
  .login        = login,
  .logout       = logout,
  .logout_all   = logout_all,
  .is_logged_in = is_logged_in,
  .get_random   = get_random,
  .get_version  = get_version
};

/*
 * Local variables:
 * indent-tabs-mode: nil
 * End:
 */
class="p">); fp_int reduced_msg[1] = INIT_FP_INT; if (fp_cmp_mag(unconst_fp_int(msg), unconst_fp_int(mod)) != FP_LT) { fp_init(reduced_msg); fp_mod(unconst_fp_int(msg), unconst_fp_int(mod), reduced_msg); msg = reduced_msg; } const size_t exp_len = (fp_unsigned_bin_size(unconst_fp_int(exp)) + 3) & ~3; const size_t mod_len = (fp_unsigned_bin_size(unconst_fp_int(mod)) + 3) & ~3; uint8_t msgbuf[mod_len]; uint8_t expbuf[exp_len]; uint8_t modbuf[mod_len]; uint8_t resbuf[mod_len]; if ((err = unpack_fp(msg, msgbuf, sizeof(msgbuf))) != HAL_OK || (err = unpack_fp(exp, expbuf, sizeof(expbuf))) != HAL_OK || (err = unpack_fp(mod, modbuf, sizeof(modbuf))) != HAL_OK || (err = hal_modexp(core, msgbuf, sizeof(msgbuf), expbuf, sizeof(expbuf), modbuf, sizeof(modbuf), resbuf, sizeof(resbuf))) != HAL_OK) goto fail; fp_read_unsigned_bin(res, resbuf, sizeof(resbuf)); fail: memset(msgbuf, 0, sizeof(msgbuf)); memset(expbuf, 0, sizeof(expbuf)); memset(modbuf, 0, sizeof(modbuf)); return err; } /* * Wrapper to let us export our modexp function as a replacement for * TFM's, to avoid dragging in all of the TFM montgomery code when we * use TFM's Miller-Rabin test code. * * This code is here rather than in a separate module because of the * error handling: TFM's error codes aren't really capable of * expressing all the things that could go wrong here. */ int fp_exptmod(fp_int *a, fp_int *b, fp_int *c, fp_int *d) { return modexp(NULL, a, b, c, d) == HAL_OK ? FP_OKAY : FP_VAL; } #else /* HAL_RSA_USE_MODEXP */ /* * Workaround to let us use TFM's software implementation of modular * exponentiation when we want to test other things and don't want to * wait for the slow FPGA implementation. */ static hal_error_t modexp(const hal_core_t *core, /* ignored */ const fp_int * const msg, const fp_int * const exp, const fp_int * const mod, fp_int *res) { hal_error_t err = HAL_OK; FP_CHECK(fp_exptmod(unconst_fp_int(msg), unconst_fp_int(exp), unconst_fp_int(mod), res)); fail: return err; } #endif /* HAL_RSA_USE_MODEXP */ /* * Create blinding factors. There are various schemes for amortizing * the cost of this over multiple RSA operations, at present we don't * try. Come back to this if it looks like a bottleneck. */ static hal_error_t create_blinding_factors(const hal_core_t *core, const hal_rsa_key_t * const key, fp_int *bf, fp_int *ubf) { assert(key != NULL && bf != NULL && ubf != NULL); uint8_t rnd[fp_unsigned_bin_size(unconst_fp_int(key->n))]; hal_error_t err = HAL_OK; if ((err = hal_get_random(NULL, rnd, sizeof(rnd))) != HAL_OK) goto fail; fp_init(bf); fp_read_unsigned_bin(bf, rnd, sizeof(rnd)); fp_copy(bf, ubf); if ((err = modexp(core, bf, key->e, key->n, bf)) != HAL_OK) goto fail; FP_CHECK(fp_invmod(ubf, unconst_fp_int(key->n), ubf)); fail: memset(rnd, 0, sizeof(rnd)); return err; } /* * RSA decryption via Chinese Remainder Theorem (Garner's formula). */ static hal_error_t rsa_crt(const hal_core_t *core, const hal_rsa_key_t * const key, fp_int *msg, fp_int *sig) { assert(key != NULL && msg != NULL && sig != NULL); hal_error_t err = HAL_OK; fp_int t[1] = INIT_FP_INT; fp_int m1[1] = INIT_FP_INT; fp_int m2[1] = INIT_FP_INT; fp_int bf[1] = INIT_FP_INT; fp_int ubf[1] = INIT_FP_INT; /* * Handle blinding if requested. */ if (blinding) { if ((err = create_blinding_factors(core, key, bf, ubf)) != HAL_OK) goto fail; FP_CHECK(fp_mulmod(msg, bf, unconst_fp_int(key->n), msg)); } /* * m1 = msg ** dP mod p * m2 = msg ** dQ mod q */ if ((err = modexp(core, msg, key->dP, key->p, m1)) != HAL_OK || (err = modexp(core, msg, key->dQ, key->q, m2)) != HAL_OK) goto fail; /* * t = m1 - m2. */ fp_sub(m1, m2, t); /* * Add zero (mod p) if needed to make t positive. If doing this * once or twice doesn't help, something is very wrong. */ if (fp_cmp_d(t, 0) == FP_LT) fp_add(t, unconst_fp_int(key->p), t); if (fp_cmp_d(t, 0) == FP_LT) fp_add(t, unconst_fp_int(key->p), t); if (fp_cmp_d(t, 0) == FP_LT) lose(HAL_ERROR_IMPOSSIBLE); /* * sig = (t * u mod p) * q + m2 */ FP_CHECK(fp_mulmod(t, unconst_fp_int(key->u), unconst_fp_int(key->p), t)); fp_mul(t, unconst_fp_int(key->q), t); fp_add(t, m2, sig); /* * Unblind if necessary. */ if (blinding) FP_CHECK(fp_mulmod(sig, ubf, unconst_fp_int(key->n), sig)); fail: fp_zero(t); fp_zero(m1); fp_zero(m2); return err; } /* * Public API for raw RSA encryption and decryption. * * NB: This does not handle PKCS #1.5 padding, at the moment that's up * to the caller. */ hal_error_t hal_rsa_encrypt(const hal_core_t *core, const hal_rsa_key_t * const key, const uint8_t * const input, const size_t input_len, uint8_t * output, const size_t output_len) { hal_error_t err = HAL_OK; if (key == NULL || input == NULL || output == NULL || input_len > output_len) return HAL_ERROR_BAD_ARGUMENTS; fp_int i[1] = INIT_FP_INT; fp_int o[1] = INIT_FP_INT; fp_read_unsigned_bin(i, unconst_uint8_t(input), input_len); if ((err = modexp(core, i, key->e, key->n, o)) != HAL_OK || (err = unpack_fp(o, output, output_len)) != HAL_OK) goto fail; fail: fp_zero(i); fp_zero(o); return err; } hal_error_t hal_rsa_decrypt(const hal_core_t *core, const hal_rsa_key_t * const key, const uint8_t * const input, const size_t input_len, uint8_t * output, const size_t output_len) { hal_error_t err = HAL_OK; if (key == NULL || input == NULL || output == NULL || input_len > output_len) return HAL_ERROR_BAD_ARGUMENTS; fp_int i[1] = INIT_FP_INT; fp_int o[1] = INIT_FP_INT; fp_read_unsigned_bin(i, unconst_uint8_t(input), input_len); /* * Do CRT if we have all the necessary key components, otherwise * just do brute force ModExp. */ if (fp_iszero(key->p) || fp_iszero(key->q) || fp_iszero(key->u) || fp_iszero(key->dP) || fp_iszero(key->dQ)) err = modexp(core, i, key->d, key->n, o); else err = rsa_crt(core, key, i, o); if (err != HAL_OK || (err = unpack_fp(o, output, output_len)) != HAL_OK) goto fail; fail: fp_zero(i); fp_zero(o); return err; } /* * Clear a key. We might want to do something a bit more energetic * than plain old memset() eventually. */ void hal_rsa_key_clear(hal_rsa_key_t *key) { if (key != NULL) memset(key, 0, sizeof(*key)); } /* * Load a key from raw components. This is a simplistic version: we * don't attempt to generate missing private key components, we just * reject the key if it doesn't have everything we expect. * * In theory, the only things we'd really need for the private key if * we were being nicer about this would be e, p, and q, as we could * calculate everything else from them. */ static hal_error_t load_key(const hal_key_type_t type, hal_rsa_key_t **key_, void *keybuf, const size_t keybuf_len, const uint8_t * const n, const size_t n_len, const uint8_t * const e, const size_t e_len, const uint8_t * const d, const size_t d_len, const uint8_t * const p, const size_t p_len, const uint8_t * const q, const size_t q_len, const uint8_t * const u, const size_t u_len, const uint8_t * const dP, const size_t dP_len, const uint8_t * const dQ, const size_t dQ_len) { if (key_ == NULL || keybuf == NULL || keybuf_len < sizeof(hal_rsa_key_t)) return HAL_ERROR_BAD_ARGUMENTS; memset(keybuf, 0, keybuf_len); hal_rsa_key_t *key = keybuf; key->type = type; #define _(x) do { fp_init(key->x); if (x == NULL) goto fail; fp_read_unsigned_bin(key->x, unconst_uint8_t(x), x##_len); } while (0) switch (type) { case HAL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PRIVATE: _(d); _(p); _(q); _(u); _(dP); _(dQ); case HAL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC: _(n); _(e); *key_ = key; return HAL_OK; default: goto fail; } #undef _ fail: memset(key, 0, sizeof(*key)); return HAL_ERROR_BAD_ARGUMENTS; } /* * Public API to load_key(). */ hal_error_t hal_rsa_key_load_private(hal_rsa_key_t **key_, void *keybuf, const size_t keybuf_len, const uint8_t * const n, const size_t n_len, const uint8_t * const e, const size_t e_len, const uint8_t * const d, const size_t d_len, const uint8_t * const p, const size_t p_len, const uint8_t * const q, const size_t q_len, const uint8_t * const u, const size_t u_len, const uint8_t * const dP, const size_t dP_len, const uint8_t * const dQ, const size_t dQ_len) { return load_key(HAL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PRIVATE, key_, keybuf, keybuf_len, n, n_len, e, e_len, d, d_len, p, p_len, q, q_len, u, u_len, dP, dP_len, dQ, dQ_len); } hal_error_t hal_rsa_key_load_public(hal_rsa_key_t **key_, void *keybuf, const size_t keybuf_len, const uint8_t * const n, const size_t n_len, const uint8_t * const e, const size_t e_len) { return load_key(HAL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC, key_, keybuf, keybuf_len, n, n_len, e, e_len, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0); } /* * Extract the key type. */ hal_error_t hal_rsa_key_get_type(const hal_rsa_key_t * const key, hal_key_type_t *key_type) { if (key == NULL || key_type == NULL) return HAL_ERROR_BAD_ARGUMENTS; *key_type = key->type; return HAL_OK; } /* * Extract public key components. */ static hal_error_t extract_component(const hal_rsa_key_t * const key, const size_t offset, uint8_t *res, size_t *res_len, const size_t res_max) { if (key == NULL) return HAL_ERROR_BAD_ARGUMENTS; const fp_int * const bn = (const fp_int *) (((const uint8_t *) key) + offset); const size_t len = fp_unsigned_bin_size(unconst_fp_int(bn)); if (res_len != NULL) *res_len = len; if (res == NULL) return HAL_OK; if (len > res_max) return HAL_ERROR_RESULT_TOO_LONG; memset(res, 0, res_max); fp_to_unsigned_bin(unconst_fp_int(bn), res); return HAL_OK; } hal_error_t hal_rsa_key_get_modulus(const hal_rsa_key_t * const key, uint8_t *res, size_t *res_len, const size_t res_max) { return extract_component(key, offsetof(hal_rsa_key_t, n), res, res_len, res_max); } hal_error_t hal_rsa_key_get_public_exponent(const hal_rsa_key_t * const key, uint8_t *res, size_t *res_len, const size_t res_max) { return extract_component(key, offsetof(hal_rsa_key_t, e), res, res_len, res_max); } /* * Generate a prime factor for an RSA keypair. * * Get random bytes, munge a few bits, and stuff into a bignum. Keep * doing this until we find a result that's (probably) prime and for * which result - 1 is relatively prime with respect to e. */ static hal_error_t find_prime(const unsigned prime_length, const fp_int * const e, fp_int *result) { uint8_t buffer[prime_length]; hal_error_t err; fp_int t[1] = INIT_FP_INT; do { if ((err = hal_get_random(NULL, buffer, sizeof(buffer))) != HAL_OK) return err; buffer[0 ] |= 0xc0; buffer[sizeof(buffer) - 1] |= 0x01; fp_read_unsigned_bin(result, buffer, sizeof(buffer)); } while (!fp_isprime(result) || (fp_sub_d(result, 1, t), fp_gcd(t, unconst_fp_int(e), t), fp_cmp_d(t, 1) != FP_EQ)); fp_zero(t); return HAL_OK; } /* * Generate a new RSA keypair. */ hal_error_t hal_rsa_key_gen(const hal_core_t *core, hal_rsa_key_t **key_, void *keybuf, const size_t keybuf_len, const unsigned key_length, const uint8_t * const public_exponent, const size_t public_exponent_len) { hal_rsa_key_t *key = keybuf; hal_error_t err = HAL_OK; fp_int p_1[1] = INIT_FP_INT; fp_int q_1[1] = INIT_FP_INT; if (key_ == NULL || keybuf == NULL || keybuf_len < sizeof(hal_rsa_key_t)) return HAL_ERROR_BAD_ARGUMENTS; memset(keybuf, 0, keybuf_len); key->type = HAL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PRIVATE; fp_read_unsigned_bin(key->e, (uint8_t *) public_exponent, public_exponent_len); if (key_length < bitsToBytes(1024) || key_length > bitsToBytes(8192)) return HAL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEY; if (fp_cmp_d(key->e, 0x010001) != FP_EQ) return HAL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEY; /* * Find a good pair of prime numbers. */ if ((err = find_prime(key_length / 2, key->e, key->p)) != HAL_OK || (err = find_prime(key_length / 2, key->e, key->q)) != HAL_OK) return err; /* * Calculate remaining key components. */ fp_init(p_1); fp_sub_d(key->p, 1, p_1); fp_init(q_1); fp_sub_d(key->q, 1, q_1); fp_mul(key->p, key->q, key->n); /* n = p * q */ fp_lcm(p_1, q_1, key->d); FP_CHECK(fp_invmod(key->e, key->d, key->d)); /* d = (1/e) % lcm(p-1, q-1) */ FP_CHECK(fp_mod(key->d, p_1, key->dP)); /* dP = d % (p-1) */ FP_CHECK(fp_mod(key->d, q_1, key->dQ)); /* dQ = d % (q-1) */ FP_CHECK(fp_invmod(key->q, key->p, key->u)); /* u = (1/q) % p */ *key_ = key; /* Fall through to cleanup */ fail: if (err != HAL_OK) memset(keybuf, 0, keybuf_len); fp_zero(p_1); fp_zero(q_1); return err; } /* * Just enough ASN.1 to read and write PKCS #1.5 RSAPrivateKey syntax * (RFC 2313 section 7.2). * * RSAPrivateKey fields in the required order. */ #define RSAPrivateKey_fields \ _(version); \ _(key->n); \ _(key->e); \ _(key->d); \ _(key->p); \ _(key->q); \ _(key->dP); \ _(key->dQ); \ _(key->u); hal_error_t hal_rsa_private_key_to_der(const hal_rsa_key_t * const key, uint8_t *der, size_t *der_len, const size_t der_max) { hal_error_t err = HAL_OK; if (key == NULL || key->type != HAL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PRIVATE) return HAL_ERROR_BAD_ARGUMENTS; fp_int version[1] = INIT_FP_INT; /* * Calculate data length. */ size_t hlen = 0, vlen = 0; #define _(x) { size_t n; if ((err = hal_asn1_encode_integer(x, NULL, &n, der_max - vlen)) != HAL_OK) return err; vlen += n; } RSAPrivateKey_fields; #undef _ /* * Encode header. */ if ((err = hal_asn1_encode_header(ASN1_SEQUENCE, vlen, der, &hlen, der_max)) != HAL_OK) return err; if (der_len != NULL) *der_len = hlen + vlen; if (der == NULL) return HAL_OK; /* * Encode data. */ der += hlen; #define _(x) { size_t n; if ((err = hal_asn1_encode_integer(x, der, &n, vlen)) != HAL_OK) return err; der += n; vlen -= n; } RSAPrivateKey_fields; #undef _ return HAL_OK; } size_t hal_rsa_private_key_to_der_len(const hal_rsa_key_t * const key) { size_t len = 0; return hal_rsa_private_key_to_der(key, NULL, &len, 0) == HAL_OK ? len : 0; } hal_error_t hal_rsa_private_key_from_der(hal_rsa_key_t **key_, void *keybuf, const size_t keybuf_len, const uint8_t *der, const size_t der_len) { if (key_ == NULL || keybuf == NULL || keybuf_len < sizeof(hal_rsa_key_t) || der == NULL) return HAL_ERROR_BAD_ARGUMENTS; memset(keybuf, 0, keybuf_len); hal_rsa_key_t *key = keybuf; key->type = HAL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PRIVATE; hal_error_t err = HAL_OK; size_t hlen, vlen; if ((err = hal_asn1_decode_header(ASN1_SEQUENCE, der, der_len, &hlen, &vlen)) != HAL_OK) return err; der += hlen; fp_int version[1] = INIT_FP_INT; #define _(x) { size_t i; if ((err = hal_asn1_decode_integer(x, der, &i, vlen)) != HAL_OK) return err; der += i; vlen -= i; } RSAPrivateKey_fields; #undef _ if (fp_cmp_d(version, 0) != FP_EQ) return HAL_ERROR_ASN1_PARSE_FAILED; *key_ = key; return HAL_OK; } /* * ASN.1 public keys in SubjectPublicKeyInfo form, see RFCs 2313, 4055, and 5280. */ static const uint8_t oid_rsaEncryption[] = { 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01 }; hal_error_t hal_rsa_public_key_to_der(const hal_rsa_key_t * const key, uint8_t *der, size_t *der_len, const size_t der_max) { if (key == NULL || (key->type != HAL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PRIVATE && key->type != HAL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC)) return HAL_ERROR_BAD_ARGUMENTS; size_t hlen, n_len, e_len; hal_error_t err; if ((err = hal_asn1_encode_integer(key->n, NULL, &n_len, 0)) != HAL_OK || (err = hal_asn1_encode_integer(key->e, NULL, &e_len, 0)) != HAL_OK) return err; const size_t vlen = n_len + e_len; if ((err = hal_asn1_encode_header(ASN1_SEQUENCE, vlen, der, &hlen, der_max)) != HAL_OK) return err; if (der != NULL) { uint8_t * const n_out = der + hlen; uint8_t * const e_out = n_out + n_len; if ((err = hal_asn1_encode_integer(key->n, n_out, NULL, der + der_max - n_out)) != HAL_OK || (err = hal_asn1_encode_integer(key->e, e_out, NULL, der + der_max - e_out)) != HAL_OK) return err; } return hal_asn1_encode_spki(oid_rsaEncryption, sizeof(oid_rsaEncryption), NULL, 0, der, hlen + vlen, der, der_len, der_max); } size_t hal_rsa_public_key_to_der_len(const hal_rsa_key_t * const key) { size_t len = 0; return hal_rsa_public_key_to_der(key, NULL, &len, 0) == HAL_OK ? len : 0; } hal_error_t hal_rsa_public_key_from_der(hal_rsa_key_t **key_, void *keybuf, const size_t keybuf_len, const uint8_t * const der, const size_t der_len) { hal_rsa_key_t *key = keybuf; if (key_ == NULL || key == NULL || keybuf_len < sizeof(*key) || der == NULL) return HAL_ERROR_BAD_ARGUMENTS; memset(keybuf, 0, keybuf_len); key->type = HAL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC; const uint8_t *alg_oid = NULL, *null = NULL, *pubkey = NULL; size_t alg_oid_len, null_len, pubkey_len; hal_error_t err; if ((err = hal_asn1_decode_spki(&alg_oid, &alg_oid_len, &null, &null_len, &pubkey, &pubkey_len, der, der_len)) != HAL_OK) return err; if (null != NULL || null_len != 0 || alg_oid == NULL || alg_oid_len != sizeof(oid_rsaEncryption) || memcmp(alg_oid, oid_rsaEncryption, alg_oid_len) != 0) return HAL_ERROR_ASN1_PARSE_FAILED; size_t len, hlen, vlen; if ((err = hal_asn1_decode_header(ASN1_SEQUENCE, pubkey, pubkey_len, &hlen, &vlen)) != HAL_OK) return err; const uint8_t * const pubkey_end = pubkey + hlen + vlen; const uint8_t *d = pubkey + hlen; if ((err = hal_asn1_decode_integer(key->n, d, &len, pubkey_end - d)) != HAL_OK) return err; d += len; if ((err = hal_asn1_decode_integer(key->e, d, &len, pubkey_end - d)) != HAL_OK) return err; d += len; if (d != pubkey_end) return HAL_ERROR_ASN1_PARSE_FAILED; *key_ = key; return HAL_OK; } /* * Local variables: * indent-tabs-mode: nil * End: */