From 86b35d757048aaa122237e1cb8fb33de9d53292d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Rob Austein Date: Sun, 20 Dec 2015 17:59:29 -0500 Subject: RPC server stuff mostly written. Compiles, not yet tested. RPC public key extraction functions on hold pending ASN.1 cleanup. --- rpc_pkey.c | 736 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 736 insertions(+) create mode 100644 rpc_pkey.c (limited to 'rpc_pkey.c') diff --git a/rpc_pkey.c b/rpc_pkey.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8fece44 --- /dev/null +++ b/rpc_pkey.c @@ -0,0 +1,736 @@ +/* + * rpc_pkey.c + * ---------- + * Remote procedure call server-side public key implementation. + * + * Authors: Rob Austein + * Copyright (c) 2015, NORDUnet A/S All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are + * met: + * - Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * - Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * - Neither the name of the NORDUnet nor the names of its contributors may + * be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS + * IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED + * TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A + * PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT + * HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED + * TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR + * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF + * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING + * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS + * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include +#include + +#include "hal.h" +#include "hal_internal.h" + +typedef struct { + hal_rpc_client_handle_t client_handle; + hal_rpc_session_handle_t session_handle; + hal_rpc_pkey_handle_t pkey_handle; + hal_key_type_t type; + hal_curve_name_t curve; + hal_key_flags_t flags; + uint8_t name[HAL_RPC_PKEY_NAME_MAX]; + size_t name_len; + int ks_hint; + /* + * This might be where we'd stash a (hal_core_t *) pointing to a + * core which has already been loaded with the key, if we were + * trying to be clever about using multiple signing cores. Moot + * point (ie, no way we could possibly test such a thing) as long as + * the FPGA is too small to hold more than one modexp core and ECDSA + * is entirely software, so skip it for now, but the implied + * semantics are interesting: a pkey handle starts to resemble an + * initialized signing core, and once all the cores are in use, one + * can't load another key without closing an existing pkey handle. + */ +} pkey_slot_t; + +#ifndef HAL_STATIC_PKEY_STATE_BLOCKS +#define HAL_STATIC_PKEY_STATE_BLOCKS 0 +#endif + +#if HAL_STATIC_PKEY_STATE_BLOCKS > 0 +static pkey_slot_t pkey_handle[HAL_STATIC_PKEY_STATE_BLOCKS]; +#endif + +/* + * Handle allocation is simple: we look for an unused (name_len == 0) + * slot in the table, and, assuming we find one, construct a composite + * handle consisting of the index into the table and a counter whose + * sole purpose is to keep the same handle from reoccurring anytime + * soon, to help identify use-after-free bugs in calling code. + */ + +static inline pkey_slot_t *alloc_slot(void) +{ +#if HAL_STATIC_PKEY_STATE_BLOCKS > 0 + static uint16_t next_glop = 0; + uint32_t glop = ++next_glop << 16; + next_glop %= 0xFFFF; + + for (int i = 0; i < sizeof(pkey_handle)/sizeof(*pkey_handle); i++) { + if (pkey_handle[i].name_len > 0) + continue; + pkey_handle[i].pkey_handle.handle = i | glop; + pkey_handle[i].ks_hint = -1; + return &pkey_handle[i]; + } +#endif + + return NULL; +} + +/* + * Check a caller-supplied handle. Must be in range, in use, and have + * the right glop. Returns slot pointer on success, NULL otherwise. + */ + +static inline pkey_slot_t *find_handle(const hal_rpc_pkey_handle_t handle) +{ +#if HAL_STATIC_PKEY_STATE_BLOCKS > 0 + const int i = (int) (handle.handle & 0xFFFF); + + if (i < sizeof(pkey_handle)/sizeof(*pkey_handle) && pkey_handle[i].pkey_handle.handle == handle.handle) + return &pkey_handle[i]; +#endif + + return NULL; +} + +/* + * Construct a PKCS #1 DigestInfo object. This requires some (very + * basic) ASN.1 encoding, which we perform inline. + */ + +static hal_error_t pkcs1_construct_digestinfo(const hal_rpc_hash_handle_t handle, + uint8_t *digest_info, size_t *digest_info_len, const size_t digest_info_max) +{ + assert(digest_info != NULL && digest_info_len != NULL); + + hal_digest_algorithm_t alg; + size_t len, alg_len; + hal_error_t err; + + if ((err = hal_rpc_hash_get_algorithm(handle, &alg)) != HAL_OK || + (err = hal_rpc_hash_get_digest_length(alg, &len)) != HAL_OK || + (err = hal_rpc_hash_get_digest_algorithm_id(alg, NULL, &alg_len, 0)) != HAL_OK) + return err; + + *digest_info_len = len + alg_len + 4; + + if (*digest_info_len >= digest_info_max) + return HAL_ERROR_RESULT_TOO_LONG; + + assert(*digest_info_len < 130); + + uint8_t *d = digest_info; + + *d++ = 0x30; /* SEQUENCE */ + *d++ = (uint8_t) (*digest_info_len - 2); + + if ((err = hal_rpc_hash_get_digest_algorithm_id(alg, d, NULL, alg_len)) != HAL_OK) + return err; + d += alg_len; + + *d++ = 0x04; /* OCTET STRING */ + *d++ = (uint8_t) len; + + assert(digest_info + *digest_info_len == d + len); + + return hal_rpc_hash_finalize(handle, d, len); +} + +/* + * Pad an octet string with PKCS #1.5 padding for use with RSA. + * + * For the moment, this only handles type 01 encryption blocks, thus + * is only suitable for use with signature and verification. If and + * when we add support for encryption and decryption, this function + * should be extended to take an argument specifying the block type + * and include support for generating type 02 encryption blocks. + * Other than the block type code, the only difference is the padding + * value: for type 01 it's constant (0xFF), for type 02 it should be + * non-zero random bytes from the CSPRNG. + * + * We use memmove() instead of memcpy() so that the caller can + * construct the data to be padded in the same buffer. + */ + +static hal_error_t pkcs1_5_pad(const uint8_t * const data, const size_t data_len, + uint8_t *block, const size_t block_len) +{ + assert(data != NULL && block != NULL); + + /* + * Congregation will now please turn to RFC 2313 8.1 as we + * construct a PKCS #1.5 type 01 encryption block. + */ + + if (data_len > block_len - 11) + return HAL_ERROR_RESULT_TOO_LONG; + + memmove(block + block_len - data_len, data, data_len); + + block[0] = 0x00; + block[1] = 0x01; + + /* This is where we'd use non-zero random bytes if constructing a type 02 block. */ + memset(block + 2, 0xFF, block_len - 3 - data_len); + + block[block_len - data_len - 1] = 0x00; + + return HAL_OK; +} + +/* + * Receive key from application, store it with supplied name, return a key handle. + */ + +static hal_error_t load(const hal_rpc_client_handle_t client, + const hal_rpc_session_handle_t session, + hal_rpc_pkey_handle_t *pkey, + const hal_key_type_t type, + const hal_curve_name_t curve, + const uint8_t * const name, const size_t name_len, + const uint8_t * const der, const size_t der_len, + const hal_key_flags_t flags) +{ + pkey_slot_t *slot; + hal_error_t err; + + assert(sizeof(slot->name) >= name_len && pkey != NULL); + + if ((slot = alloc_slot()) == NULL) + return HAL_ERROR_NO_KEY_SLOTS_AVAILABLE; + + if ((err = hal_ks_store(type, curve, flags, name, name_len, der, der_len, &slot->ks_hint)) != HAL_OK) + return err; + + memcpy(slot->name, name, name_len); + slot->client_handle = client; + slot->session_handle = session; + slot->type = type; + slot->curve = curve; + slot->flags = flags; + slot->name_len = name_len; + + *pkey = slot->pkey_handle; + return HAL_OK; +} + +/* + * Look up a key given its name, return a key handle. + */ + +static hal_error_t find(const hal_rpc_client_handle_t client, + const hal_rpc_session_handle_t session, + hal_rpc_pkey_handle_t *pkey, + const hal_key_type_t type, + const uint8_t * const name, const size_t name_len) +{ + pkey_slot_t *slot; + hal_error_t err; + + assert(sizeof(slot->name) >= name_len && pkey != NULL); + + if ((slot = alloc_slot()) == NULL) + return HAL_ERROR_NO_KEY_SLOTS_AVAILABLE; + + if ((err = hal_ks_fetch(type, name, name_len, &slot->curve, &slot->flags, NULL, NULL, 0, &slot->ks_hint)) != HAL_OK) + return err; + + memcpy(slot->name, name, name_len); + slot->client_handle = client; + slot->session_handle = session; + slot->type = type; + slot->name_len = name_len; + + *pkey = slot->pkey_handle; + return HAL_OK; +} + +/* + * Generate a new RSA key with supplied name, return a key handle. + */ + +static hal_error_t generate_rsa(const hal_rpc_client_handle_t client, + const hal_rpc_session_handle_t session, + hal_rpc_pkey_handle_t *pkey, + const uint8_t * const name, const size_t name_len, + const unsigned key_length, + const uint8_t * const public_exponent, const size_t public_exponent_len, + const hal_key_flags_t flags) +{ + pkey_slot_t *slot; + hal_error_t err; + + assert(sizeof(slot->name) >= name_len && pkey != NULL && (key_length & 7) == 0); + + if ((slot = alloc_slot()) == NULL) + return HAL_ERROR_NO_KEY_SLOTS_AVAILABLE; + + uint8_t keybuf[hal_rsa_key_t_size]; + hal_rsa_key_t *key = NULL; + + if ((err = hal_rsa_key_gen(NULL, &key, keybuf, sizeof(keybuf), key_length / 8, + public_exponent, public_exponent_len)) != HAL_OK) + return err; + + uint8_t der[hal_rsa_key_to_der_len(key)]; + size_t der_len; + + if ((err = hal_rsa_key_to_der(key, der, &der_len, sizeof(der))) == HAL_OK) + err = hal_ks_store(HAL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PRIVATE, HAL_CURVE_NONE, flags, + name, name_len, der, der_len, &slot->ks_hint); + + memset(keybuf, 0, sizeof(keybuf)); + memset(der, 0, sizeof(der)); + + if (err != HAL_OK) + return err; + + memcpy(slot->name, name, name_len); + slot->client_handle = client; + slot->session_handle = session; + slot->type = HAL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PRIVATE; + slot->curve = HAL_CURVE_NONE; + slot->flags = flags; + slot->name_len = name_len; + + *pkey = slot->pkey_handle; + return HAL_OK; +} + +/* + * Generate a new EC key with supplied name, return a key handle. + * At the moment, EC key == ECDSA key, but this is subject to change. + */ + +static hal_error_t generate_ec(const hal_rpc_client_handle_t client, + const hal_rpc_session_handle_t session, + hal_rpc_pkey_handle_t *pkey, + const uint8_t * const name, const size_t name_len, + const hal_curve_name_t curve, + const hal_key_flags_t flags) +{ + pkey_slot_t *slot; + hal_error_t err; + + assert(sizeof(slot->name) >= name_len && pkey != NULL); + + if ((slot = alloc_slot()) == NULL) + return HAL_ERROR_NO_KEY_SLOTS_AVAILABLE; + + uint8_t keybuf[hal_ecdsa_key_t_size]; + hal_ecdsa_key_t *key = NULL; + + if ((err = hal_ecdsa_key_gen(NULL, &key, keybuf, sizeof(keybuf), curve)) != HAL_OK) + return err; + + uint8_t der[hal_ecdsa_key_to_der_len(key)]; + size_t der_len; + + if ((err = hal_ecdsa_key_to_der(key, der, &der_len, sizeof(der))) == HAL_OK) + err = hal_ks_store(HAL_KEY_TYPE_EC_PRIVATE, curve, flags, + name, name_len, der, der_len, &slot->ks_hint); + + memset(keybuf, 0, sizeof(keybuf)); + memset(der, 0, sizeof(der)); + + if (err != HAL_OK) + return err; + + memcpy(slot->name, name, name_len); + slot->client_handle = client; + slot->session_handle = session; + slot->type = HAL_KEY_TYPE_EC_PRIVATE; + slot->curve = curve; + slot->flags = flags; + slot->name_len = name_len; + + *pkey = slot->pkey_handle; + return HAL_OK; +} + +/* + * Discard key handle, leaving key intact. + */ + +static hal_error_t close(const hal_rpc_pkey_handle_t pkey) +{ + pkey_slot_t *slot; + + if ((slot = find_handle(pkey)) == NULL) + return HAL_ERROR_KEY_NOT_FOUND; + + memset(slot, 0, sizeof(*slot)); + + return HAL_OK; +} + +/* + * Delete a key from the store, given its key handle. + */ + +static hal_error_t delete(const hal_rpc_pkey_handle_t pkey) +{ + pkey_slot_t *slot = find_handle(pkey); + + if (slot == NULL) + return HAL_ERROR_KEY_NOT_FOUND; + + hal_error_t err = hal_ks_delete(slot->type, slot->name, slot->name_len, &slot->ks_hint); + + if (err == HAL_OK || err == HAL_ERROR_KEY_NOT_FOUND) + memset(slot, 0, sizeof(*slot)); + + return err; +} + +/* + * Get type of key associated with handle. + */ + +static hal_error_t get_key_type(const hal_rpc_pkey_handle_t pkey, + hal_key_type_t *type) +{ + if (type == NULL) + return HAL_ERROR_BAD_ARGUMENTS; + + pkey_slot_t *slot = find_handle(pkey); + + if (slot == NULL) + return HAL_ERROR_KEY_NOT_FOUND; + + *type = slot->type; + + return HAL_OK; +} + +/* + * Get flags of key associated with handle. + */ + +static hal_error_t get_key_flags(const hal_rpc_pkey_handle_t pkey, + hal_key_flags_t *flags) +{ + if (flags == NULL) + return HAL_ERROR_BAD_ARGUMENTS; + + pkey_slot_t *slot = find_handle(pkey); + + if (slot == NULL) + return HAL_ERROR_KEY_NOT_FOUND; + + *flags = slot->flags; + + return HAL_OK; +} + +/* + * Get length of public key associated with handle. + */ + +static size_t get_public_key_len(const hal_rpc_pkey_handle_t pkey) +{ + return 0; +} + +/* + * Get public key associated with handle. + */ + +static hal_error_t get_public_key(const hal_rpc_pkey_handle_t pkey, + uint8_t *der, size_t *der_len, const size_t der_len_max) +{ + /* + * Still missing some of the public key format ASN.1 stuff, apparently. Feh. + */ + return HAL_ERROR_IMPOSSIBLE; +#warning get_public_key() not implemented +} + +/* + * Sign something using private key associated with handle. + * + * RSA has enough quirks that it's simplest to split this out into + * algorithm-specific functions. + */ + +static hal_error_t sign_rsa(uint8_t *keybuf, const size_t keybuf_len, + const uint8_t * const der, const size_t der_len, + const hal_rpc_hash_handle_t hash, + const uint8_t * input, size_t input_len, + uint8_t * signature, size_t *signature_len, const size_t signature_max) +{ + hal_rsa_key_t *key = NULL; + hal_error_t err; + + assert(signature != NULL && signature_len != NULL); + assert((hash.handle == hal_rpc_hash_handle_none.handle) != (input == NULL || input_len == 0)); + + if ((err = hal_rsa_key_from_der(&key, keybuf, keybuf_len, der, der_len)) != HAL_OK || + (err = hal_rsa_key_get_modulus(key, NULL, signature_len, 0)) != HAL_OK) + return err; + + if (*signature_len > signature_max) + return HAL_ERROR_RESULT_TOO_LONG; + + if (input == NULL) { + if ((err = pkcs1_construct_digestinfo(hash, signature, &input_len, *signature_len)) != HAL_OK) + return err; + input = signature; + } + + if ((err = pkcs1_5_pad(input, input_len, signature, *signature_len)) != HAL_OK || + (err = hal_rsa_decrypt(NULL, key, signature, *signature_len, signature, *signature_len)) != HAL_OK) + return err; + + return HAL_OK; +} + +static hal_error_t sign_ecdsa(uint8_t *keybuf, const size_t keybuf_len, + const uint8_t * const der, const size_t der_len, + const hal_rpc_hash_handle_t hash, + const uint8_t * input, size_t input_len, + uint8_t * signature, size_t *signature_len, const size_t signature_max) +{ + hal_ecdsa_key_t *key = NULL; + hal_error_t err; + + assert(signature != NULL && signature_len != NULL); + assert((hash.handle == hal_rpc_hash_handle_none.handle) != (input == NULL || input_len == 0)); + + if ((err = hal_ecdsa_key_from_der(&key, keybuf, keybuf_len, der, der_len)) != HAL_OK) + return err; + + if (input == NULL) { + hal_digest_algorithm_t alg; + + if ((err = hal_rpc_hash_get_algorithm(hash, &alg)) != HAL_OK || + (err = hal_rpc_hash_get_digest_length(alg, &input_len)) != HAL_OK) + return err; + + if (input_len < signature_max) + return HAL_ERROR_RESULT_TOO_LONG; + + if ((err = hal_rpc_hash_finalize(hash, signature, input_len)) != HAL_OK) + return err; + + input = signature; + } + + if ((err = hal_ecdsa_sign(NULL, key, input, input_len, signature, signature_len, signature_max, + HAL_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_FORMAT_PKCS11)) != HAL_OK) + return err; + + return HAL_OK; +} + +static hal_error_t sign(const hal_rpc_session_handle_t session, + const hal_rpc_pkey_handle_t pkey, + const hal_rpc_hash_handle_t hash, + const uint8_t * const input, const size_t input_len, + uint8_t * signature, size_t *signature_len, const size_t signature_max) +{ + pkey_slot_t *slot = find_handle(pkey); + + if (slot == NULL) + return HAL_ERROR_KEY_NOT_FOUND; + + hal_error_t (*signer)(uint8_t *keybuf, const size_t keybuf_len, + const uint8_t * const der, const size_t der_len, + const hal_rpc_hash_handle_t hash, + const uint8_t * const input, const size_t input_len, + uint8_t * signature, size_t *signature_len, const size_t signature_max); + + switch (slot->type) { + case HAL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PRIVATE: + signer = sign_rsa; + break; + case HAL_KEY_TYPE_EC_PRIVATE: + signer = sign_ecdsa; + break; + default: + return HAL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEY; + } + + uint8_t keybuf[hal_rsa_key_t_size > hal_ecdsa_key_t_size ? hal_rsa_key_t_size : hal_ecdsa_key_t_size]; + uint8_t der[HAL_KS_WRAPPED_KEYSIZE]; + size_t der_len; + hal_error_t err; + + err = hal_ks_fetch(slot->type, slot->name, slot->name_len, NULL, NULL, der, &der_len, sizeof(der), &slot->ks_hint); + + if (err == HAL_OK) + err = signer(keybuf, sizeof(keybuf), der, der_len, hash, input, input_len, signature, signature_len, signature_max); + + memset(keybuf, 0, sizeof(keybuf)); + memset(der, 0, sizeof(der)); + + return err; +} + +/* + * Verify something using private key associated with handle. + * + * RSA has enough quirks that it's simplest to split this out into + * algorithm-specific functions. + */ + +static hal_error_t verify_rsa(uint8_t *keybuf, const size_t keybuf_len, + const uint8_t * const der, const size_t der_len, + const hal_rpc_hash_handle_t hash, + const uint8_t * input, size_t input_len, + const uint8_t * const signature, const size_t signature_len) +{ + uint8_t expected[signature_len], received[signature_len]; + hal_rsa_key_t *key = NULL; + hal_error_t err; + + assert(signature != NULL && signature_len > 0); + assert((hash.handle == hal_rpc_hash_handle_none.handle) != (input == NULL || input_len == 0)); + + if ((err = hal_rsa_key_from_der(&key, keybuf, keybuf_len, der, der_len)) != HAL_OK) + return err; + + if (input == NULL) { + if ((err = pkcs1_construct_digestinfo(hash, expected, &input_len, sizeof(expected))) != HAL_OK) + return err; + input = expected; + } + + if ((err = pkcs1_5_pad(input, input_len, expected, sizeof(expected))) != HAL_OK || + (err = hal_rsa_encrypt(NULL, key, signature, signature_len, received, sizeof(received))) != HAL_OK) + return err; + + unsigned diff = 0; + for (int i = 0; i < signature_len; i++) + diff |= expected[i] ^ received[i]; + + if (diff != 0) + return HAL_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + + return HAL_OK; +} + +static hal_error_t verify_ecdsa(uint8_t *keybuf, const size_t keybuf_len, + const uint8_t * const der, const size_t der_len, + const hal_rpc_hash_handle_t hash, + const uint8_t * input, size_t input_len, + const uint8_t * const signature, const size_t signature_len) +{ + uint8_t digest[signature_len]; + hal_ecdsa_key_t *key = NULL; + hal_error_t err; + + assert(signature != NULL && signature_len > 0); + assert((hash.handle == hal_rpc_hash_handle_none.handle) != (input == NULL || input_len == 0)); + + if ((err = hal_ecdsa_key_from_der(&key, keybuf, keybuf_len, der, der_len)) != HAL_OK) + return err; + + if (input == NULL) { + hal_digest_algorithm_t alg; + + if ((err = hal_rpc_hash_get_algorithm(hash, &alg)) != HAL_OK || + (err = hal_rpc_hash_get_digest_length(alg, &input_len)) != HAL_OK || + (err = hal_rpc_hash_finalize(hash, digest, sizeof(digest))) != HAL_OK) + return err; + + input = digest; + } + + if ((err = hal_ecdsa_verify(NULL, key, input, input_len, signature, signature_len, + HAL_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_FORMAT_PKCS11)) != HAL_OK) + return err; + + return HAL_OK; +} + +static hal_error_t verify(const hal_rpc_session_handle_t session, + const hal_rpc_pkey_handle_t pkey, + const hal_rpc_hash_handle_t hash, + const uint8_t * const input, const size_t input_len, + const uint8_t * const signature, const size_t signature_len) +{ + pkey_slot_t *slot = find_handle(pkey); + + if (slot == NULL) + return HAL_ERROR_KEY_NOT_FOUND; + + hal_error_t (*verifier)(uint8_t *keybuf, const size_t keybuf_len, + const uint8_t * const der, const size_t der_len, + const hal_rpc_hash_handle_t hash, + const uint8_t * const input, const size_t input_len, + const uint8_t * const signature, const size_t signature_len); + + switch (slot->type) { + case HAL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PRIVATE: + case HAL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC: + verifier = verify_rsa; + break; + case HAL_KEY_TYPE_EC_PRIVATE: + case HAL_KEY_TYPE_EC_PUBLIC: + verifier = verify_ecdsa; + break; + default: + return HAL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEY; + } + + uint8_t keybuf[hal_rsa_key_t_size > hal_ecdsa_key_t_size ? hal_rsa_key_t_size : hal_ecdsa_key_t_size]; + uint8_t der[HAL_KS_WRAPPED_KEYSIZE]; + size_t der_len; + hal_error_t err; + + err = hal_ks_fetch(slot->type, slot->name, slot->name_len, NULL, NULL, der, &der_len, sizeof(der), &slot->ks_hint); + + if (err == HAL_OK) + err = verifier(keybuf, sizeof(keybuf), der, der_len, hash, input, input_len, signature, signature_len); + + memset(keybuf, 0, sizeof(keybuf)); + memset(der, 0, sizeof(der)); + + return err; +} + + +/* + * List keys in the key store. + */ + +static hal_error_t list(hal_rpc_pkey_key_info_t *result, + unsigned *result_len, + const unsigned result_max) +{ + return hal_ks_list(result, result_len, result_max); +} + +const hal_rpc_pkey_dispatch_t hal_rpc_local_pkey_dispatch = { + load, find, generate_rsa, generate_ec, close, delete, + get_key_type, get_key_flags, get_public_key_len, get_public_key, + sign, verify, list +}; + +/* + * Local variables: + * indent-tabs-mode: nil + * End: + */ -- cgit v1.2.3