From e6bdf57820121b6eac9f35c8ef53a4e7a76205e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Rob Austein Date: Sun, 20 May 2018 18:18:40 -0400 Subject: Better hal_core_alloc() semantics, assert() and printf() cleanup. Various fixes extracted from the abandoned(-for-now?) reuse-cores branch, principally: * Change hal_core_alloc*() to support core reuse and to pick the least-recently-used core of a particular type otherwise; * Replace assert() and printf() calls with hal_assert() and hal_log(), respectively. assert() is particularly useless on the HSM, since it sends its error message into hyperspace then hangs the HSM. --- aes_keywrap.c | 18 +++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) (limited to 'aes_keywrap.c') diff --git a/aes_keywrap.c b/aes_keywrap.c index 355cb0b..be082f6 100644 --- a/aes_keywrap.c +++ b/aes_keywrap.c @@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ static hal_error_t do_block(const hal_core_t *core, uint8_t *b1, uint8_t *b2) { hal_error_t err; - assert(b1 != NULL && b2 != NULL); + hal_assert(b1 != NULL && b2 != NULL); if ((err = hal_io_write(core, AES_ADDR_BLOCK0, b1, 8)) != HAL_OK || (err = hal_io_write(core, AES_ADDR_BLOCK2, b2, 8)) != HAL_OK || @@ -164,15 +164,16 @@ hal_error_t hal_aes_keywrap(hal_core_t *core, size_t *C_len) { const size_t calculated_C_len = hal_aes_keywrap_ciphertext_length(m); + const int free_core = core == NULL; hal_error_t err; size_t n; - assert(calculated_C_len % 8 == 0); + hal_assert(calculated_C_len % 8 == 0); if (Q == NULL || C == NULL || C_len == NULL || *C_len < calculated_C_len) return HAL_ERROR_BAD_ARGUMENTS; - if ((err = hal_core_alloc(AES_CORE_NAME, &core)) != HAL_OK) + if (free_core && (err = hal_core_alloc(AES_CORE_NAME, &core, NULL)) != HAL_OK) return err; if ((err = load_kek(core, K, K_len, KEK_encrypting)) != HAL_OK) @@ -215,7 +216,8 @@ hal_error_t hal_aes_keywrap(hal_core_t *core, } out: - hal_core_free(core); + if (free_core) + hal_core_free(core); return err; } @@ -226,13 +228,14 @@ out: * Q should be the same size as C. Q and C can overlap. */ -hal_error_t hal_aes_keyunwrap(hal_core_t * core, +hal_error_t hal_aes_keyunwrap(hal_core_t *core, const uint8_t *K, const size_t K_len, const uint8_t * const C, const size_t C_len, uint8_t *Q, size_t *Q_len) { + const int free_core = core == NULL; hal_error_t err; size_t n; size_t m; @@ -240,7 +243,7 @@ hal_error_t hal_aes_keyunwrap(hal_core_t * core, if (C == NULL || Q == NULL || C_len % 8 != 0 || C_len < 16 || Q_len == NULL || *Q_len < C_len) return HAL_ERROR_BAD_ARGUMENTS; - if ((err = hal_core_alloc(AES_CORE_NAME, &core)) != HAL_OK) + if (free_core && (err = hal_core_alloc(AES_CORE_NAME, &core, NULL)) != HAL_OK) return err; if ((err = load_kek(core, K, K_len, KEK_decrypting)) != HAL_OK) @@ -294,7 +297,8 @@ hal_error_t hal_aes_keyunwrap(hal_core_t * core, memmove(Q, Q + 8, m); out: - hal_core_free(core); + if (free_core) + hal_core_free(core); return err; } -- cgit v1.2.3