sw/libhal - Cryptech libhal: crypto software, HSM management, RPC

Age	Commit message (Collapse)	Author
2016-09-01	Move in-memory keystore from client to server. Whack with club until compiles.	Rob Austein
	Fixes for various minor issues found while integrating with sw/stm32. Moving the in-memory keystore (PKCS #11 session objects, etc) from the client library to the HSM was on the near term to-do list in any case, doing it now turned out to be the easiest way to solve one of the build problems.
2016-06-23	ks_flash returns all-ones instead of all-zeros for "blank" memory, cope.	Rob Austein
	This will need refactoring once we have a proper test for whether the HSM is initializing after receiving a fresh software load.
2016-06-10	Allow host-side libhal build without access to secure hardware to	Rob Austein
	store unencrypted public keys (we don't allow this for private keys). Yet another screwball feature to support PKCS #11, sigh. Anyway, with this change, mixed-mode builds should work again.
2016-05-25	Start cleaning up PIN code.	Rob Austein

2016-05-17	Increment return count, not pointer to return count. Feh, C.	Rob Austein

2016-05-15	Tweak keystore API to allow update-in-place, so hal_ks_rename() will work.	Rob Austein

2016-05-15	Add hal_rpc_pkey_rename(); allow null string as (temporary) key name.	Rob Austein
	Temporary nature of null string as key name is not enforced by the keystore code, it's just a convention to allow callers to generate a keypair, obtain the public key, hash that to a Subject Key Identifier (SKI), and rename the key using the SKI as the new name. This is a compromise to let us use SKI-based key names in PKCS #11 while keeping the keystore code simple.
2016-05-14	Trailing whitespace cleanup.	Rob Austein

2016-03-11	First round of debugging based on RPC pkey tests: mostly ASN.1	Rob Austein
	silliness, with a bit of PKCS #1.5 padding silliness for desert.
2016-03-03	Initial implementations of ks_get_kek(). Untested, and none of these	Rob Austein
	are secure (the one in ks_flash.c is a stub, and the others are for cases where we have no secure hardware in which to store the KEK). These are primarily for testing, since in the long run the entire software implementation of AES-keywrap will be replaced by Verilog which never lets software see the unwrapped key. Or so says current theory. For the moment, we just need something that will let us test the rest of the RPC and keystore mechanisms.
2016-02-25	RPC over loopback socket, just to work out the mechanics for serialization ↵	Paul Selkirk
	and dispatch.
2015-12-24	More work on PIN/login/logout code. Access control still missing,	Rob Austein
	committing now so Paul has a chance to look at the current RPC API.
2015-12-23	RPC interface to TRNG and (incomplete) PIN code.	Rob Austein

2015-12-20	RPC server stuff mostly written. Compiles, not yet tested. RPC	Rob Austein
	public key extraction functions on hold pending ASN.1 cleanup.