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Static code analysis (Doxygen call graph) detected a low-probability
race condition which could have triggered a deadlock on the keystore
mutex if the mkmif code returns with an error like HAL_ERROR_CORE_BUSY
when we're trying to fetch the KEK.
This is a knock-on effect of the awful kludge of backing up the KEK in
the keystore flash as an alternative to powering the MKM with a
battery as called for in the design. This code path should not exist
at all, but, for now, we avoid the deadlock by making it the caller's
responsibility to grab the keystore mutex before looking up the KEK.
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success, but reduces the failure rate on a busy server.
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conditions.
This manifested as hal_aes_keyunwrap() returning HAL_ERROR_CORE_BUSY, but
getting reported as HAL_OK, which led to HAL_ERROR_ASN1_PARSE_FAILED
when trying to parse the not-unwrapped der.
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We're using non-blocking I/O in any case, might as well take advantage
of it to keep console output a little smoother.
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pkey_open() now looks in both keystores rather than requiring the user
to know. The chance of collision with randomly-generated UUID is low
enough that we really ought to be able to present a single namespace.
So now we do.
pkey_match() now takes a couple of extra arguments which allow a
single search to cover both keystores, as well as matching for
specific key flags. The former interface was pretty much useless for
anything involving flags, and required the user to issue a separate
call for each keystore.
User wheel is now exempt from the per-session key lookup constraints,
Whether this is a good idea or not is an interesting question, but the
whole PKCS #11 derived per-session key thing is weird to begin with,
and having keystore listings on the console deliberately ignore
session keys was just too confusing.
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Enforce minimum PKCS #1.5 padding length when decrypting KEK.
Use public interface to hal_pkey_load() rather than calling the
internal function directly, so we go through all the normal error
checks.
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Now that we use PKCS #8 format for private keys, all key formats we
use include ASN.1 AlgorithmIdentifier field describing the key, so
specifying key type and curve as arguments to hal_rpc_pkey_load() is
neither necessary nor particularly useful.
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Borrowing an idea from PyCrypto, we substitute CSPRNG output for the
value of a decrypted KEK if the PKCS #1.5 type 02 block format check
fails. Done properly, this should be very close to constant-time, and
should make it harder to use hal_rpc_pkey_import() as an oracle.
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In the long run this code will fork for two different purposes:
a) A user backup script, which need not handle ASN.1 or crypto, thus
can (and should) be really simple; and
b) Unit test code for the key export and import functions.
So far, hal_rpc_pkey_export() appears to be working, at least under
light testing (result of unpacking everything looks like a key,
anyway, haven't tested the unpacked key yet).
Still need to write test code for hal_rpc_pkey_import().
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Among other things, it turns out that this works better if one
remembers to write the RPC server dispatch code as well as the client
code, doh.
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Still missing Python script to drive backup process, and need to do
something about setting the EXPORTABLE key flag for this to be useful.
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Handle AlgorithmIdentifier.parameters as in SubjectPublicKeyInfo: the
field is OPTIONAL, but it's usually set to NULL if no OID is present.
I have a vague memory that this is fallout from a specification error
years ago in which the OPTIONAL was accidently left out. Whatever.
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A few parsing problems remaining, mostly with objects large enough
that PKCS #8 may have pushed them over some buffer size or another.
These are all with RSA, where the Python code (PyCrypto) already
supported PKCS #8, so most likely it's a problem in the new C code.
Python ECDSA PKCS #8 shim code is nasty and could use some cleanup.
If practical, we might want to sub-class ecdsa.keys.SigningKey; we
might also want to flesh this out into something we can send upstream
to the author of the Python ecdsa library.
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Compiles, not yet tested. Existing tests need conversion to PKCS #8
before we can do anything useful with this.
Once everything uses PKCS #8 instead of algorithm-specific formats, we
can revisit API issues like whether hal_rpc_pkey_load() should still
be taking `type` and `curve` arguments.
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This will almost certainly merge into test scripts or libhal.py at
some later date, right now just get it into git for archive.
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Support for the core/pkey/ecdsa{256,384} cores is cooked before the
branch on which it was based. Oops. Time to backport.
See pymux branch for original commit history. git should do the right
thing when the pymux branch is cooked enough to merge back to the ksng
or master branches.
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Support for core/pkey/ecdsa256 and core/pkey/ecdsa384.
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Exporting CFLAGS as an environment variable turns out to interact
badly with certain other settings here. I *think* this only happens
when we use one of the shorthand targets which re-runs make in the
same directory with non-default settings, but this is complicated
enough without having to remember which voodoo triggers it. So
instead of exporting CFLAGS as an environment variable we just pass it
on the command line in the handful of cases where it's needed.
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