diff options
-rw-r--r-- | asn1.c | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | ks.c | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | ks_mmap.c | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | ks_volatile.c | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | rpc_pkey.c | 36 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | tests/test-rpc_pkey.c | 22 |
6 files changed, 49 insertions, 15 deletions
@@ -161,7 +161,8 @@ hal_error_t hal_asn1_encode_spki(const uint8_t * const alg_oid, const size_t a const uint8_t * const pubkey, const size_t pubkey_len, uint8_t *der, size_t *der_len, const size_t der_max) { - if (alg_oid == NULL || alg_oid_len == 0 || pubkey == NULL || pubkey_len == 0 || (curve_oid == NULL && curve_oid_len != 0)) + if (alg_oid == NULL || alg_oid_len == 0 || pubkey_len == 0 || + (der != NULL && pubkey == NULL) || (curve_oid == NULL && curve_oid_len != 0)) return HAL_ERROR_BAD_ARGUMENTS; const uint8_t curve_oid_tag = curve_oid == NULL ? ASN1_NULL : ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER; @@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ hal_error_t hal_ks_store(const hal_key_type_t type, hal_ks_key_t k; memset(&k, 0, sizeof(k)); + k.der_len = sizeof(k.der); uint8_t kek[KEK_LENGTH]; size_t kek_len; @@ -168,6 +168,7 @@ hal_error_t hal_ks_get_kek(uint8_t *kek, return err; memcpy(kek, kekbuf, len); + *kek_len = len; return HAL_OK; } diff --git a/ks_volatile.c b/ks_volatile.c index b71e27e..9a47d52 100644 --- a/ks_volatile.c +++ b/ks_volatile.c @@ -132,6 +132,7 @@ hal_error_t hal_ks_get_kek(uint8_t *kek, return err; memcpy(kek, kekbuf, len); + *kek_len = len; return HAL_OK; } @@ -669,13 +669,13 @@ static hal_error_t sign(const hal_session_handle_t session, } /* - * Verify something using private key associated with handle. + * Verify something using public key associated with handle. * * RSA has enough quirks that it's simplest to split this out into * algorithm-specific functions. */ -static hal_error_t verify_rsa(uint8_t *keybuf, const size_t keybuf_len, +static hal_error_t verify_rsa(uint8_t *keybuf, const size_t keybuf_len, const hal_key_type_t type, const uint8_t * const der, const size_t der_len, const hal_hash_handle_t hash, const uint8_t * input, size_t input_len, @@ -688,7 +688,18 @@ static hal_error_t verify_rsa(uint8_t *keybuf, const size_t keybuf_len, assert(signature != NULL && signature_len > 0); assert((hash.handle == hal_hash_handle_none.handle) != (input == NULL || input_len == 0)); - if ((err = hal_rsa_private_key_from_der(&key, keybuf, keybuf_len, der, der_len)) != HAL_OK) + switch (type) { + case HAL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PRIVATE: + err = hal_rsa_private_key_from_der(&key, keybuf, keybuf_len, der, der_len); + break; + case HAL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC: + err = hal_rsa_public_key_from_der(&key, keybuf, keybuf_len, der, der_len); + break; + default: + err = HAL_ERROR_IMPOSSIBLE; + } + + if (err != HAL_OK) return err; if (input == NULL) { @@ -711,7 +722,7 @@ static hal_error_t verify_rsa(uint8_t *keybuf, const size_t keybuf_len, return HAL_OK; } -static hal_error_t verify_ecdsa(uint8_t *keybuf, const size_t keybuf_len, +static hal_error_t verify_ecdsa(uint8_t *keybuf, const size_t keybuf_len, const hal_key_type_t type, const uint8_t * const der, const size_t der_len, const hal_hash_handle_t hash, const uint8_t * input, size_t input_len, @@ -724,7 +735,18 @@ static hal_error_t verify_ecdsa(uint8_t *keybuf, const size_t keybuf_len, assert(signature != NULL && signature_len > 0); assert((hash.handle == hal_hash_handle_none.handle) != (input == NULL || input_len == 0)); - if ((err = hal_ecdsa_private_key_from_der(&key, keybuf, keybuf_len, der, der_len)) != HAL_OK) + switch (type) { + case HAL_KEY_TYPE_EC_PRIVATE: + err = hal_ecdsa_private_key_from_der(&key, keybuf, keybuf_len, der, der_len); + break; + case HAL_KEY_TYPE_EC_PUBLIC: + err = hal_ecdsa_public_key_from_der(&key, keybuf, keybuf_len, der, der_len); + break; + default: + err = HAL_ERROR_IMPOSSIBLE; + } + + if (err != HAL_OK) return err; if (input == NULL) { @@ -755,7 +777,7 @@ static hal_error_t verify(const hal_session_handle_t session, if (slot == NULL) return HAL_ERROR_KEY_NOT_FOUND; - hal_error_t (*verifier)(uint8_t *keybuf, const size_t keybuf_len, + hal_error_t (*verifier)(uint8_t *keybuf, const size_t keybuf_len, const hal_key_type_t type, const uint8_t * const der, const size_t der_len, const hal_hash_handle_t hash, const uint8_t * const input, const size_t input_len, @@ -782,7 +804,7 @@ static hal_error_t verify(const hal_session_handle_t session, err = hal_ks_fetch(slot->type, slot->name, slot->name_len, NULL, NULL, der, &der_len, sizeof(der), &slot->ks_hint); if (err == HAL_OK) - err = verifier(keybuf, sizeof(keybuf), der, der_len, hash, input, input_len, signature, signature_len); + err = verifier(keybuf, sizeof(keybuf), slot->type, der, der_len, hash, input, input_len, signature, signature_len); memset(keybuf, 0, sizeof(keybuf)); memset(der, 0, sizeof(der)); diff --git a/tests/test-rpc_pkey.c b/tests/test-rpc_pkey.c index 4fdead9..6506ea6 100644 --- a/tests/test-rpc_pkey.c +++ b/tests/test-rpc_pkey.c @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ static int test_rsa_testvec(const rsa_tc_t * const tc) tc->dQ.val, tc->dQ.len)) != HAL_OK) return printf("Could not load RSA private key from test vector: %s\n", hal_error_string(err)), 0; - const uint8_t private_label[] = "private key", public_label[] = "private key"; + const uint8_t private_label[] = "RSA private key", public_label[] = "RSA public key"; uint8_t private_der[hal_rsa_private_key_to_der_len(tc_key)]; uint8_t public_der[hal_rsa_public_key_to_der_len(tc_key)]; @@ -99,17 +99,25 @@ static int test_rsa_testvec(const rsa_tc_t * const tc) HAL_KEY_FLAG_USAGE_DIGITALSIGNATURE)) != HAL_OK) return printf("Could not load public key into RPC: %s\n", hal_error_string(err)), 0; - uint8_t m_buf[tc->m.len], s_buf[tc->s.len]; + uint8_t sig[tc->s.len]; - if ((err = hal_rpc_pkey_sign(session, private_key, hal_hash_handle_none, tc->m.val, tc->m.len, - s_buf, &len, sizeof(s_buf))) != HAL_OK) + /* + * Raw RSA test cases include PKCS #1.5 padding, we need to drill down to the DigestInfo. + */ + assert(tc->m.len > 4 && tc->m.val[0] == 0x00 && tc->m.val[1] == 0x01 && tc->m.val[2] == 0xff); + const uint8_t *digestinfo = memchr(tc->m.val + 2, 0x00, tc->m.len - 2); + assert(digestinfo != NULL); + const size_t digestinfo_len = tc->m.val + tc->m.len - ++digestinfo; + + if ((err = hal_rpc_pkey_sign(session, private_key, hal_hash_handle_none, + digestinfo, digestinfo_len, sig, &len, sizeof(sig))) != HAL_OK) return printf("Could not sign: %s\n", hal_error_string(err)), 0; - if (tc->s.len != len || memcmp(s_buf, tc->s.val, tc->s.len) != 0) + if (tc->s.len != len || memcmp(sig, tc->s.val, tc->s.len) != 0) return printf("MISMATCH\n"), 0; - if ((err = hal_rpc_pkey_verify(session, public_key, hal_hash_handle_none, tc->s.val, tc->s.len, - m_buf, sizeof(m_buf))) != HAL_OK) + if ((err = hal_rpc_pkey_verify(session, public_key, hal_hash_handle_none, + digestinfo, digestinfo_len, tc->s.val, tc->s.len)) != HAL_OK) return printf("Could not verify: %s\n", hal_error_string(err)), 0; if ((err = hal_rpc_pkey_delete(private_key)) != HAL_OK) |