diff options
author | Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net> | 2016-05-12 09:50:33 -0400 |
---|---|---|
committer | Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net> | 2016-05-12 09:50:33 -0400 |
commit | e95df39ced0199cf654e4fb276c543ec5fe6308a (patch) | |
tree | ec22588ef62da13e57abfb241291cedc1c62215d | |
parent | 44b189bfea1a7d965098acdcc781a193209d9179 (diff) |
Add hal_digest_algorithm_none; tweak handling of none handles.
-rw-r--r-- | hal.h | 5 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | rpc_api.c | 12 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | rpc_pkey.c | 8 |
3 files changed, 14 insertions, 11 deletions
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ * Memory map, access functions, and HAL for Cryptech cores. * * Authors: Joachim Strombergson, Paul Selkirk, Rob Austein - * Copyright (c) 2015, NORDUnet A/S All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2015-2016, NORDUnet A/S All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are @@ -227,6 +227,7 @@ typedef struct hal_hash_driver hal_hash_driver_t; */ typedef enum { + hal_digest_algorithm_none, hal_digest_algorithm_sha1, hal_digest_algorithm_sha256, hal_digest_algorithm_sha512_224, @@ -544,6 +545,8 @@ extern hal_error_t hal_ecdsa_verify(const hal_core_t *core, * mechanism, not the server (HSM) side. */ +#define HAL_HANDLE_NONE (0) + typedef struct { uint32_t handle; } hal_client_handle_t; typedef struct { uint32_t handle; } hal_session_handle_t; @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ #include "hal.h" #include "hal_internal.h" -const hal_hash_handle_t hal_hash_handle_none = {0}; +const hal_hash_handle_t hal_hash_handle_none = {HAL_HANDLE_NONE}; static inline int check_pkey_type(const hal_key_type_t type) { @@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ hal_error_t hal_rpc_hash_get_digest_algorithm_id(const hal_digest_algorithm_t al hal_error_t hal_rpc_hash_get_algorithm(const hal_hash_handle_t hash, hal_digest_algorithm_t *alg) { - if (hash.handle == hal_hash_handle_none.handle || alg == NULL) + if (hash.handle == HAL_HANDLE_NONE || alg == NULL) return HAL_ERROR_BAD_ARGUMENTS; return hal_rpc_hash_dispatch->get_algorithm(hash, alg); } @@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ hal_error_t hal_rpc_hash_initialize(const hal_client_handle_t client, hal_error_t hal_rpc_hash_update(const hal_hash_handle_t hash, const uint8_t * data, const size_t length) { - if (hash.handle == hal_hash_handle_none.handle || data == NULL) + if (hash.handle == HAL_HANDLE_NONE || data == NULL) return HAL_ERROR_BAD_ARGUMENTS; if (length == 0) return HAL_OK; @@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ hal_error_t hal_rpc_hash_update(const hal_hash_handle_t hash, hal_error_t hal_rpc_hash_finalize(const hal_hash_handle_t hash, uint8_t *digest, const size_t length) { - if (hash.handle == hal_hash_handle_none.handle || digest == NULL || length == 0) + if (hash.handle == HAL_HANDLE_NONE || digest == NULL || length == 0) return HAL_ERROR_BAD_ARGUMENTS; return hal_rpc_hash_dispatch->finalize(hash, digest, length); } @@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ hal_error_t hal_rpc_pkey_sign(const hal_session_handle_t session, uint8_t * signature, size_t *signature_len, const size_t signature_max) { if (signature == NULL || signature_len == NULL || signature_max == 0 || - (hash.handle == hal_hash_handle_none.handle) == (input == NULL || input_len == 0)) + (hash.handle == HAL_HANDLE_NONE) == (input == NULL || input_len == 0)) return HAL_ERROR_BAD_ARGUMENTS; return hal_rpc_pkey_dispatch->sign(session, pkey, hash, input, input_len, signature, signature_len, signature_max); } @@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ hal_error_t hal_rpc_pkey_verify(const hal_session_handle_t session, const uint8_t * const signature, const size_t signature_len) { if (signature == NULL || signature_len == 0 || - (hash.handle == hal_hash_handle_none.handle) == (input == NULL || input_len == 0)) + (hash.handle == HAL_HANDLE_NONE) == (input == NULL || input_len == 0)) return HAL_ERROR_BAD_ARGUMENTS; return hal_rpc_pkey_dispatch->verify(session, pkey, hash, input, input_len, signature, signature_len); } @@ -565,7 +565,7 @@ static hal_error_t sign_rsa(uint8_t *keybuf, const size_t keybuf_len, hal_error_t err; assert(signature != NULL && signature_len != NULL); - assert((hash.handle == hal_hash_handle_none.handle) != (input == NULL || input_len == 0)); + assert((hash.handle == HAL_HANDLE_NONE) != (input == NULL || input_len == 0)); if ((err = hal_rsa_private_key_from_der(&key, keybuf, keybuf_len, der, der_len)) != HAL_OK || (err = hal_rsa_key_get_modulus(key, NULL, signature_len, 0)) != HAL_OK) @@ -597,7 +597,7 @@ static hal_error_t sign_ecdsa(uint8_t *keybuf, const size_t keybuf_len, hal_error_t err; assert(signature != NULL && signature_len != NULL); - assert((hash.handle == hal_hash_handle_none.handle) != (input == NULL || input_len == 0)); + assert((hash.handle == HAL_HANDLE_NONE) != (input == NULL || input_len == 0)); if ((err = hal_ecdsa_private_key_from_der(&key, keybuf, keybuf_len, der, der_len)) != HAL_OK) return err; @@ -686,7 +686,7 @@ static hal_error_t verify_rsa(uint8_t *keybuf, const size_t keybuf_len, const ha hal_error_t err; assert(signature != NULL && signature_len > 0); - assert((hash.handle == hal_hash_handle_none.handle) != (input == NULL || input_len == 0)); + assert((hash.handle == HAL_HANDLE_NONE) != (input == NULL || input_len == 0)); switch (type) { case HAL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PRIVATE: @@ -733,7 +733,7 @@ static hal_error_t verify_ecdsa(uint8_t *keybuf, const size_t keybuf_len, const hal_error_t err; assert(signature != NULL && signature_len > 0); - assert((hash.handle == hal_hash_handle_none.handle) != (input == NULL || input_len == 0)); + assert((hash.handle == HAL_HANDLE_NONE) != (input == NULL || input_len == 0)); switch (type) { case HAL_KEY_TYPE_EC_PRIVATE: |